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Abstract 
This study examines attrition, biases and the survivor premium of hedge fund returns for the 
period 1994-2001.  We estimate an attrition rate of nearly 9 per cent per year which is twice the 
rate reported in mutual fund studies.  We measure the various hedge fund biases and we find that 
database returns may be overestimated by as much as 45 per cent.  This paper finds that chronic 
poor performance is the common characteristic of non-survivors. We then examine an important 
concept known as the survivor premium which receives little research attention. The survivor 
premium measures the difference in returns between survivors and non-survivors which is 
estimated at nearly 10 per cent per annum. We find that the hedge fund survivor premium is 2 to 
4 times the size of the mutual fund survivor premium.  This significant hedge fund survivor 
premium highlights its importance to investors. We develop an economic rationale for the 
survivor premium for the first time. We propose that the mutual fund survivor premium is 
associated with idiosyncratic risk only, while the significant hedge fund survivor premium is 
associated with both systematic and idiosyncractic risks. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The hedge fund debate raises contentious views on whether these fund managers provide return 
and diversification benefits to investors.  While advocates say that hedge funds provide investors 
with truly alternative investment strategies, critics argue that hedge funds provide little benefit 
and charge high management fees for the privilege.  One of the reasons for these polarised 
opinions is due to the variations that exist in the returns of individual hedge fund managers and 
their peer-group indices.  It is only in recent times that researchers have had the opportunity to 
examine hedge fund databases to develop a clearer picture of the return and risk profile of this 
emerging class of fund manager.   
 
This paper examines a sample of hedge funds in order to derive important information content for 
investors who wish to analyse individual hedge fund investment.  This paper provides four main 
findings.  First, the hedge fund mortality rate in this sample is estimated at 8.43 per cent per year 
which is twice the size of those reported in mutual fund studies.  We find that 59 per cent of 
hedge funds at the start of the sample do not survive the full sample period.  Second, the paper 
finds that non-survivors are strongly associated with short life-spans (i.e. 3.92 years) and chronic 
poor performance.  Third, this paper estimates survivorship bias at 301 basis points (hereafter 
‘bps’) per year which is twice the size reported in mutual fund studies, and instant history bias at 
167 bps per year.  We provide an incremental contribution by estimating multiperiod sampling 
bias across a variety of minimum survival criteria. Multiperiod sampling bias is estimated in this 
sample at 21, 71 and 90 bps per year across 12, 24 and 36 months, respectively.  The biases 
estimated in this paper suggest that survivor-biases database returns can be inflated by as much as 
45 per cent.  
 
Finally, we examine the survivor premium, which is a concept in the data bias literature which 
receives little research attention.  The survivor premium is the reward garnered by investors who 
by skill or luck invest in survivors-only and avoid non-survivors.  We estimate an economic 
benefit from the survivor premium of 974 bps per year. This significant survivor premium 
suggests the paramount importance for investors to select survivors and avoiding non-survivors in 
a hedge fund investment portfolio.  In fact, the hedge fund survivor premium is estimated at two 
to four times the survivor premium estimated in mutual fund studies.  In this paper, we develop 
an economic rationale for the survivor premium for the first time.  We propose that the small 
mutual fund survivor premium is attributed to the idiosyncratic risk of active mutual fund 
managers. Conversely, the significant hedge fund survivor premium is a result of both systematic 
and idiosyncratic risks which dominates hedge fund returns. 
 
 
2. RELATED LITERATURE 
While this paper analyses attrition and biases in hedge funds, it is the mutual fund literature 
which provides the origins of survivorship bias and attrition.  The early studies from Grinblatt and 
Titman (1989, 1992), Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Ross (1992) and Malkiel (1995) 
demonstrate that mutual fund returns have been inflated due to the exclusion of non-surviving 
funds in performance studies.  Subsequent studies such as Elton, Gruber and Blake (1996) 
demonstrated that attrition rates and survivorship are closely linked to poor performance, while 
Carpenter and Lynch (1999) showed that survivorship not only affects returns but may also affect 
performance persistence estimations. 
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Although data biases, attrition and survivorship have been considered in mutual fund studies 
since Grinblatt and Titman (1989), it is a relatively new area in the hedge fund literature.  While 
some of the bias and survivorship methods can be borrowed from mutual fund studies, industry 
dynamics exist in hedge fund databases which make them difficult to analyse.1  Survivorship was 
one of the first hedge fund biases considered in Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1999), Fung 
and Hsieh (2000), Liang (2000, 2001) and Malkiel and Saha (2005). Consistent with mutual fund 
studies, hedge fund survivorship bias was found to inflate industry-wide return estimates.2  
 
The second source of bias found in hedge fund database returns is instant history bias (or 
backfilling bias) which was explored in Edwards and Park (1996), Fung and Hsieh (2000), 
Edwards and Caglayan (2001) and Malkiel and Saha (2005).  This is a unique bias caused by the 
voluntary reporting regime in the global hedge fund industry.  The voluntary nature of hedge fund 
reporting allows funds to develop a performance track record in their first few months of 
operation prior to disclosing their performance to database vendors. If the hedge fund generates 
favourable returns from its inception, it will report its performance to database vendors in the 
hope of raising capital for their fund.  The database vendor obtains the historical fund 
performance and inserts or backfills their database with these monthly returns thereby creating an 
instant history in the database. Alternately, a new hedge fund with poor performance will have a 
lower tendency to report their performance to database vendors as they have a lower probability 
of raising capital with poor returns. The literature informs us that this strategic behaviour in the 
hedge fund industry tends to create an instant history bias which causes inflated hedge fund 
returns. 
 
The third type of bias in hedge fund returns is multiperiod sampling bias which has been explored 
in the mutual fund literature by Carpenter and Lynch (1999) and Carhart, Carpenter, Lynch and 
Musto (2002), and has also been considered in hedge fund studies such as Fung and Hsieh (2000) 
and Edwards and Caglayan (2001). Multiperiod sampling bias is a contamination caused by the 
researcher who impose a minimum survival criteria (e.g. the requirement of at least 36 months of 
performance history) for funds to be included in an analysis.  The mutual and hedge fund 
literature demonstrates that this simple but subtle restriction by the researcher tends to cause 
survival requirements on the data which tends to induce biases in mutual fund and hedge fund 
performance estimates. 
 
While the focus of research attention has been on data biases and survivorship, the recent 
introduction of non-survivors provides the researcher with new types of information content.  One 
of these new areas of interest is the ‘survivor premium’ which was introduced by Blake and 
Timmermann (1998) to describe the difference in mean returns between an equal-weighted 
portfolio of survivors-only less the equal-weighted portfolio of non-survivors over the same 
sample period.  It describes the economic significance that can be earned by those skilled or lucky 
enough to have invested in a portfolio that is exclusively composed of surviving funds versus the 
                                                 
1 A possible end-of-life reporting bias may exist in hedge fund returns, however, there is no data or valid 
methodology to comprehensively measure this form of bias. 
  
2 Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999) documents another bias which exists whereby successful 
funds cease reporting their results to database vendors as they have raised the capital they required and 
have no need to continue to report their results to anyone other than their investors.  These funds that do not 
report imply that current disclosed returns may be downward bias as they do not include these successfully 
managed funds.  Numerous examples of this include the renowned Renaissance Technologies Medallion 
Fund and the Global Asset Management GAMUT Fund managed by Caxton Corp who have been closed to 
investors for numerous years. 
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performance drag of a portfolio that is selected exclusively with non-survivors.3  In this paper, we 
estimate the hedge fund survivor premium for the first time and we compare it with the mutual 
fund survivor premium. Although Blake and Timmermann (1998) define the survivor premium, 
we contribute to the literature developing an economic rationale to better understand the variation 
in the survivor premium between mutual funds and hedge funds. 
 
 
3. DATA 
The database employed in the analysis was sourced from Tremont (TASS) Europe Limited which 
consists of ninety-two monthly return observations of both surviving and non-surviving hedge 
funds for the period January 1994 to August 2001.  A total of 3,012 hedge funds were available 
for analysis, composed of 1,836 survivors and 1,176 non-survivors.  The funds in the dataset are 
divided into 11 distinct investment styles as defined by TASS.4  The summary statistics of the 
individual funds in the sample are presented in Table 1.  The descriptive statistics show hedge 
fund returns possess extreme values within each investment style while the third and fourth 
moments provide information that the distributions of hedge fund returns are not symmetrical.  
The descriptive statistics in this study are consistent with similar results reported in Ackermann, 
McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999), Brown et. al., (1999) and Asness, Krail and Liew (2001). 5 
 
Table 1 
Hedge Fund Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the hedge fund dataset.  The sample consists of 3,012 funds consisting 
of both survivors and non-survivors. The statistics reported in this table are the mean values of the descriptive 
statistics reported by each individual hedge fund. FOF denotes fund of funds. * and ** denote statistical significance 
at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Categories Mean Maximum Minimum Standard Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Jarque-
Bera 
All Funds (inc FOFs) 0.962 6.631 -5.105 1.866 0.256 4.008 4.898 
All Funds (ex FOFs) 1.042 6.837 -5.312 1.916 0.212 4.055 4.959 
Convertible Arbitrage 0.993 3.799 -3.895 1.272 -0.931 4.758 25.145** 
Dedicated Short Bias 0.404 22.484 -12.103 5.596 0.688 4.511 16.014** 
Emerging Markets 0.673 12.094 -21.608 5.026 -0.772 6.022 44.140** 
Equity Market Neutral 1.087 3.378 -1.032 0.835 0.010 2.988 0.002 
Event Driven 1.057 4.269 -6.904 1.412 -1.808 12.393 388.332** 
Fixed Income Arbitrage 0.789 2.669 -6.291 1.104 -3.343 21.015 1415.385** 
Fund of Funds (i.e. FOFs) 0.636 5.632 -4.156 1.730 0.342 3.591 3.132 
Global Macro 0.752 7.111 -3.792 2.085 1.017 4.348 22.838** 
Long/Short Equity Hedge 1.506 11.547 -8.522 3.105 0.249 4.562 10.297** 
Managed Futures 0.635 7.788 -4.054 2.428 0.343 2.860 1.884 
Other 0.742 6.661 -6.565 2.290 -0.151 3.467 1.186 
 
 
                                                 
3 It is important to recognize that the survivor premium and survivorship bias are different calculations as 
they measure different data estimates. 
 
4 These investment style categories were: Convertible Arbitrage, Dedicated Short Bias, Emerging Markets, 
Equity Market Neutral, Event-Driven, Fixed Income Arbitrage, Fund of Funds, Global Macro, Long/Short 
Equity Hedge, Managed Futures and Other. 
 
5 There are very few studies that report descriptive statistics on individual hedge funds.  A large proportion 
of hedge fund studies limit their analysis to hedge fund indices or aggregate the results in the form of equal 
weighted averages rather than results on individual hedge funds. 
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4. RESULTS 
A. Attrition Rates 
To appreciate the impact of hedge fund non-survivors, we estimate the mean annual attrition rate 
at 8.67 per cent per year.  The sample also shows only 371 funds (or 40.9 per cent) of the 907 
funds reporting in January 1994 survived the full sample period. The attrition estimates in this 
paper are consistent with those found in Fung and Hsieh (1997b), Brown et. al., (1999), Liang 
(2000), Liang (2001), Brown, Goetzmann and Park (2001) and Chan, Getmansky, Hass and Lo 
(2005) who estimated hedge fund attrition rates in a range from 4.3 per cent to 15 per cent per 
year.  The age distribution data shows that, on average, 50 per cent of non-survivors die within 30 
months (i.e. 2.50 years), while 70 per cent of the non-survivors die within 47 months (i.e. 3.92 
years). When survivors are included with the non-survivors, the average and median life span of 
all hedge funds in the sample are 47 months (i.e. 3.92 years) and 44 months (i.e. 3.67 years), 
respectively.  These estimates of very short life-spans of hedge funds are similar to the works of 
Edwards and Caglayan (2001a) and Brown et. al., (2001). 
 
Table 2 
Births and Deaths of Hedge Funds 
The birth and death rates were calculated as the number of funds that were born or died during a particular 
calendar year divided by the number of funds in existence at the end of the previous year.  The attrition 
rates were calculated as the number of funds that died in a particular year divided by the funds alive at the 
end of the previous year. Please note that the 2001 data contains 8 months only from January to August. 
Year Funds born during year 
Birth rate 
(%) 
Funds dying 
during year 
Death rate 
(%) 
Funds alive at 
end of year 
< 1994 907 NA NA NA 907 
1994 263 29.1 21 2.3 1150 
1995 276 24.1 68 5.9 1359 
1996 306 22.6 136 10.0 1530 
1997 334 21.9 109 7.1 1756 
1998 310 17.7 174 9.9 1893 
1999 307 16.3 197 10.4 2004 
2000 223 11.2 249 12.4 1979 
2001 87 4.4 222 11.2 1860 
    µ =8.67  
 
In order to appreciate hedge fund attrition rates, a comparison can be made with the mutual fund 
industry.  The Lunde, Timmermann and Blake (1999) study found that 70 per cent of UK mutual 
funds died within 3 to 15 years and the annual attrition rate was 4.56 per cent per annum.  In 
another article, Carhart, Carpenter, Lynch and Musto (2002) estimate US mutual fund attrition at 
no more than 3.6 per cent per year.  In terms of life-spans (see Figure 1), this paper estimates that 
70 per cent of hedge funds die within 47 months (i.e. 3.92 years) and the annual attrition rate is 
8.67 per cent per annum.  The evidence provided shows that hedge funds have relatively short 
life-spans and hedge fund attrition rates are twice the levels of those reported in mutual fund 
studies. 
 
The high attrition rates in this sample inform us that non-survivors must have a significant 
influence on the level of data bias in this sample.  The significant number of non-survivors 
terminating over the 1994-2001 period suggests that hedge fund research that excludes non-
survivors will lead to empirical results that are spurious and misleading. The inclusion of non-
survivors leads us to consider survivorship and instant history bias. 
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Figure 1 
Age Distribution of Non-Survivors 
 
B. Survivorship Bias 
Survivorship bias in hedge fund returns has been extensively recognized in Brown, Goetzmann 
and Ibbotson (1999), Fung and Hsieh (2000), Liang (2000, 2001), Malkiel and Saha (2005) who 
all follow the Malkiel (1995) methodology in defining this bias.  Table 2 presents the 
survivorship bias estimates on this hedge fund sample and summarises the return and volatility 
estimates of the full sample and across investment styles.6  The focus of this paper is in the 
category, "All Funds (ex FOFs)" which excludes fund of funds as they invest their funds in 
individual hedge funds.  The results presented in Table 2 show that survivors-only generated an 
annual rate of return of 15.12 per cent while the dataset containing both survivors and non-
survivors generated an annual return of 12.11 per cent. These calculations produce an estimated 
survivorship bias in this sample of 301 basis points per year.  The survivorship bias estimate from 
this study is consistent with the findings in Brown et. al., (1999), Fung and Hsieh (2000), Liang 
(2001) and Malkiel and Saha (2005) who estimated survivorship bias in the global hedge fund 
industry at 300, 300 and 243 and 432 bps per year, respectively.   
 
 
 
                                                 
6 It is important to recognise that the TASS classification categories are specific to TASS themselves. Other 
hedge fund data vendors categorise the hedge fund industry using other categories and classifications. For 
example, HFR Research divides the hedge fund industry into:- Convertible Arbitrage, Distressed Securities, 
Emerging Markets, Equity Hedge, Event Driven, Fixed Income, Fund of Funds, Macro, Merger Arbitrage, 
Relative Value Arbitrage, and Sector. As a second example, the VAN Hedge Fund Advisors classify funds 
into: Aggressive Growth, Distressed Securities, Emerging Markets, Fund of Funds, Income, Macro, Market 
Neutral – Arbitrage, Market Neutral – Securities Hedging, Market Timing Opportunistic, Several 
Strategies, Short Selling, Special Situations, and Value. We can see that each hedge fund data vendor has 
their own investment style classification system. 
 
Table 3 
Survivorship Bias Estimates 
The table presents the return and volatility estimates of the full sample, survivors and non-survivors in their respective investment style categories. These results allows 
survivorship bias to be calculated which is the return of survivors only minus the return of all funds.  The sample period is from January 1994 to August 2001.   Ann. ROR 
denotes annualised rate of return.  Ann. S.D. denotes annualised standard deviation. Survivor Bias denotes the bias between survivors only and the full sample of all funds.  
Bias S.E. denotes the standard error mean of the survivorship bias.  A variety of statistical equality tests are presented to test the difference between the sample of survivors 
`and non-survivors.  The p-value for Mean Difference is the parametric two-tailed t-test for equality of means.  The p-value for Median Difference is the nonparametric 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks two-tailed test for equality of medians.  The p-value for Variance Difference is the two-tailed F-test for equality of variances. *, ** and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
             Survivors/Non-survivors 
 All Funds  Survivors  Non-survivors  Bias Estimate  Difference in Sample Tests 
Categories Ann. 
ROR 
(%) 
Ann. 
S.D. 
(%)  
Ann. 
ROR 
(%) 
Ann. 
S.D. 
(%)  
Ann. 
ROR 
(%) 
Ann. 
S.D. 
(%)  
Survivor 
Bias 
(%) 
Bias 
S.E. 
(%) 
 p-value 
for 
Mean 
Diff. 
p-value 
for 
Median 
Diff. 
p-value 
for 
Variance 
Diff. 
All Funds (inc FOFs) 11.18 6.51  13.99 6.53  4.47 7.54  2.81 0.034  0.000** 0.010** 0.172 
All Funds (ex FOFs) 12.11 6.70  15.12 6.78  5.07 7.70  3.01 0.035  0.000** 0.009** 0.227 
Convertible Arbitrage 11.79 4.39  12.51 4.22  7.77 8.01  0.72 0.031  0.000** 0.365 0.000** 
Dedicated Short Bias 6.33 19.72  6.50 18.77  2.42 22.64  0.17 0.134  0.051 0.566 0.075 
Emerging Markets 7.28 17.46  10.21 19.44  2.83 15.88  2.93 0.105  0.000** 0.404 0.055 
Equity Market Neutral 12.91 2.90  15.38 3.04  6.02 4.44  2.47 0.058  0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
Event Driven 12.23 5.03  12.92 4.77  9.28 7.04  0.69 0.034  0.000** 0.128 0.000** 
Fixed Income Arbitrage 9.38 3.81  12.49 4.08  0.51 9.70  3.11 0.059  0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
Fund of Funds (i.e. FOFs) 7.41 5.99  9.54 5.59  2.71 7.78  2.13 0.053  0.000** 0.017* 0.002** 
Global Macro 8.89 7.19  13.63 10.15  3.23 7.59  4.74 0.264  0.000** 0.045* 0.006** 
Long/Short Equity Hedge 17.40 10.86  19.57 10.46  9.87 14.00  2.17 0.038  0.000** 0.187 0.006** 
Managed Futures 7.96 8.42  12.20 10.08  2.67 8.13  4.24 0.090  0.000** 0.070 0.042* 
Other 8.65 7.67  12.53 7.41  1.16 10.11  3.88 0.209  0.000** 0.006** 0.003** 
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In order to appreciate the magnitude in hedge fund survivorship bias, a comparison can be made 
with the traditional mutual fund industry. Brown and Goetzmann (1995), Malkiel (1995), Elton, 
Gruber and Blake (1996) and Carhart, Carpenter, Lynch and Musto (2002) estimated survivorship 
bias in mutual funds at 20 to 140 bps per year. When one considers that hedge fund survivorship 
bias has been estimated in a range between 300 to 432 bps per year, the empirical evidence 
suggests that hedge fund survivorship bias is at least twice the size than those reported in mutual 
fund studies.7 These results demonstrate that exclusion of non-survivors in a hedge fund analysis 
will result in the gross overestimation of industry-wide hedge fund returns.  
 
C. Instant History Bias (or Backfilling Bias) 
The second bias calculated on this dataset is instant history bias (IHB) which employs the same 
methodology as Fung and Hsieh (2000) and Edwards and Caglayan (2001). IHB is estimated by 
excluding the first twelve months of every hedge fund’s performance.8  The results in Table 4 
estimate the IHB on the full sample at 167 bps per year (i.e. 12.11 per cent in Table 3 minus 
10.44 per cent in Table 4) from 1994 to 2001. This estimate is consistent with Fung and Hsieh’s 
(2000) annual IHB estimate of 140 bps per year.  The results in Table 4 show that IHB is evident 
across the full sample and investment styles.  The estimates of IHB in Table 4 in comparison to 
Table 3 are significant as they show that across all investment styles, the IHB adjustment reduces 
the annual rates of return for survivors and non-survivors except for the Dedicated Short Bias 
non-survivor group. These results confirm that hedge fund returns, on average, permeate an 
upward bias due to the inclusion of the first twelve months of a hedge fund’s performance record. 
This is further evidence of the importance of the data collection process when conducting hedge 
fund research, as IHB is a unique bias due to the voluntary reporting regime of the global hedge 
fund industry. 
 
 
                                                 
7 While Brown et. al., (1999), Fung and Hsieh (2000), Liang (2001) and Malkiel and Saha (2005) report 
annual hedge fund survivorship bias estimates of 3.00, 3.00 and 2.43 per cent respectively, the work of 
Ackermann et al., (1999) reported an unusually low annual hedge fund survivorship bias at 0.16%, 
however, their research methodology has been heavily criticised in the subsequent hedge fund literature.   
 
8 Fung and Hsieh (2000) and Brown, Goetzmann and Park (2001) estimate a fund incubation period of 15 
months prior to funds appearing on hedge fund databases. Given this finding, Fung and Hsieh (2000) 
remove the first twelve months of performance history in order to estimate instant history bias. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Instant History (Backfilling) Bias Estimates 
The table presents the return and volatility estimates of the full sample, survivors and non-survivors in their respective investment style categories. These results 
are adjusted for instant history bias as each individual fund in each category has the first twelve months of performance history removed.  Instant history bias is 
calculated as the return of all funds in Table 3 minus the returns of all funds in this table.  The sample period is from January 1994 to August 2001.   Ann. ROR 
denotes annualised rate of return.  Ann. S.D. denotes annualised standard deviation. IHB Bias denotes the level of instant history bias between the returns of all 
funds in Table 3 and Table 4.  Bias S.E. denotes the standard error mean of the instant history bias.  A variety of statistical equality tests are presented to test the 
difference between the sample of survivors and non-survivors.  The p-value for Mean Difference is the parametric two-tailed t-test for equality of means.  The p-
value for Median Difference is the nonparametric Wilcoxon Signed Ranks two-tailed test for equality of medians.  The p-value for Variance Difference is the 
two-tailed F-test for equality of variances. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
             Survivors/Non-survivors 
 All Funds  Survivors  Non-survivors  Bias Estimate  Difference in Sample Tests 
Categories Ann. 
ROR 
(%) 
Ann. 
S.D. 
(%)  
Ann. 
ROR 
(%) 
Ann. 
S.D. 
(%)  
Ann. 
ROR 
(%) 
Ann. 
S.D. 
(%)  
IHB 
Bias 
(%) 
Bias 
S.E. 
(%) 
 p-value 
for 
Mean 
Diff. 
p-value 
for 
Median 
Diff. 
p-value 
for 
Variance 
Diff. 
All Funds (inc FOFs) 9.69 6.53  12.46 6.59  3.20 7.47  1.49 0.027  0.011** 0.014** 0.250 
All Funds (ex FOFs) 10.44 6.70  13.37 6.83  3.63 7.64  1.67 0.028  0.009*** 0.014** 0.292 
Convertible Arbitrage 10.81 4.70  11.39 4.63  7.48 8.52  0.98 0.031  0.232 0.507 0.000*** 
Dedicated Short Bias 5.81 19.67  5.96 19.16  2.70 21.82  0.52 0.132  0.915 0.556 0.165 
Emerging Markets 4.94 18.24  6.69 20.00  1.48 16.56  2.34 0.097  0.546 0.540 0.081* 
Equity Market Neutral 11.46 3.02  13.83 3.41  4.72 4.52  1.45 0.046  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.011** 
Event Driven 11.35 5.04  12.18 4.92  8.20 7.11  0.88 0.030  0.234 0.105 0.001*** 
Fixed Income Arbitrage 7.83 3.70  9.65 4.26  -0.55 9.79  1.55 0.072  0.013** 0.008*** 0.000*** 
Fund of Funds (i.e. FOFs) 6.91 6.17  9.14 5.78  1.76 7.97  0.50 0.046  0.045** 0.017** 0.003*** 
Global Macro 6.70 7.43  10.26 8.06  1.93 7.92  2.19 0.091  0.044** 0.043** 0.844 
Long/Short Equity Hedge 15.02 10.93  17.33 10.58  7.07 14.20  2.38 0.034  0.110 0.201 0.005*** 
Managed Futures 7.41 8.57  12.15 10.25  1.82 8.50  0.55 0.098  0.036** 0.056* 0.080* 
Other 8.18 8.03  11.53 7.21  -0.81 12.53  0.47 0.324  0.033** 0.018** 0.000*** 
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Table 5 
Multiperiod Sampling Bias 
This table reports the effect of multiperiod sampling bias on annual returns and standard deviation estimates on the full 
sample and across investment styles. The results suggest an upward bias on returns as you impose a longer minimum 
performance history, however, there is little impact on standard deviation estimates. Ann. ROR  denotes annualized rate of 
return. Ann. S.D. denotes annualised standard deviation. Ratio denotes annualized rate of return divided by annualised 
standard deviation. MB Bias denotes the multiperiod sampling bias which are the returns of each respective panel minus 
the returns in Panel A. Bias S.E. denotes the standard error mean of the multiperiod sampling bias. 
Panel A: Survivors and non-survivors adjusted for survivorship and instant history bias. 
Panel B: Panel A data and funds must have an additional 12 months of performance data. 
Panel C: Panel A data and funds must have an additional 24 months of performance data. 
Panel D: Panel A data and funds must have an additional 36 months of performance data. 
             
  Panel A:  Panel B: 
 
Categories 
 Ann. 
ROR 
(%) 
Ann. 
S.D. 
(%) Ratio 
MS 
Bias 
(%) 
Bias 
S.E. 
(%) 
 Ann. 
ROR 
(%) 
Ann. 
S.D. 
(%) 
 
Ratio 
MS 
Bias 
(%) 
Bias 
S.E. 
(%) 
All Funds (inc FOFs)  9.69 6.53 1.48 NA NA  9.88 6.53 1.51 0.19 0.003 
All Funds (ex FOFs)  10.44 6.70 1.56 NA NA  10.65 6.70 1.59 0.21 0.003 
Convertible Arbitrage  10.81 4.70 2.30 NA NA  10.84 4.73 2.29 0.03 0.004 
Dedicated Short Bias  5.81 19.67 0.30 NA NA  5.95 19.66 0.30 0.14 0.025 
Emerging Markets  4.94 18.24 0.27 NA NA  4.97 18.24 0.27 0.03 0.007 
Equity Market Neutral  11.46 3.02 3.79 NA NA  11.76 2.99 3.93 0.30 0.006 
Event Driven  11.35 5.04 2.25 NA NA  11.40 5.03 2.27 0.05 0.002 
Fixed Income Arbitrage  7.83 3.70 2.12 NA NA  8.13 3.70 2.20 0.30 0.009 
Fund of Funds (FOFs)  6.91 6.17 1.12 NA NA  7.00 6.17 1.13 0.09 0.003 
Global Macro  6.70 7.43 0.90 NA NA  6.90 7.54 0.92 0.20 0.011 
Long/Short Equity Hedge  15.02 10.93 1.37 NA NA  15.08 10.95 1.38 0.06 0.005 
Managed Futures  7.41 8.57 0.86 NA NA  7.77 8.59 0.90 0.36 0.009 
Other  8.18 8.03 1.02 NA NA  8.85 7.65 1.16 0.67 0.032 
             
  Panel C:  Panel D: 
 
Categories 
 Ann. 
ROR 
(%) 
Ann. 
S.D. 
(%) 
 
Ratio 
MS 
Bias 
(%) 
Bias 
S.E. 
(%) 
 Ann. 
ROR 
(%) 
Ann. 
S.D. 
(%) 
 
Ratio 
MS 
Bias 
(%) 
Bias 
S.E. 
(%) 
All Funds (inc FOFs)  10.31 6.57 1.57 0.62 0.009  10.48 6.55 1.60 0.79 0.015 
All Funds (ex FOFs)  11.15 6.75 1.65 0.71 0.010  11.34 6.72 1.69 0.90 0.018 
Convertible Arbitrage  11.06 4.81 2.30 0.25 0.009  10.85 5.04 2.15 0.04 0.022 
Dedicated Short Bias  6.16 20.01 0.31 0.35 0.033  6.94 20.22 0.34 1.13 0.058 
Emerging Markets  5.00 18.61 0.27 0.06 0.025  4.55 18.53 0.25 -0.39 0.049 
Equity Market Neutral  11.94 3.07 3.89 0.48 0.017  11.54 3.00 3.85 0.08 0.025 
Event Driven  11.31 4.98 2.27 -0.04 0.007  11.79 4.94 2.39 0.44 0.021 
Fixed Income Arbitrage  8.52 3.71 2.30 0.69 0.016  8.42 3.78 2.23 0.59 0.022 
Fund of Funds (FOFs)  7.20 6.17 1.17 0.29 0.010  7.47 6.21 1.20 0.56 0.014 
Global Macro  7.78 7.61 1.02 1.08 0.027  8.06 7.96 1.01 1.36 0.040 
Long/Short Equity Hedge  15.57 10.90 1.43 0.55 0.013  15.80 11.07 1.43 0.78 0.022 
Managed Futures  8.48 8.85 0.96 1.07 0.028  9.05 9.28 0.98 1.64 0.040 
Other  9.06 8.03 1.13 0.88 0.082  9.99 7.32 1.36 1.81 0.330 
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D. Multiperiod Sampling Bias 
There is no generally accepted method to calculate multiperiod sampling bias (MSB), so we 
therefore employ the same methodology as Fung and Hsieh (2000) and Edwards and Caglayan 
(2001). MSB is calculated by comparing the results of the adjusted set of returns against the same 
data conditional upon funds requiring a further 12, 24 and 36 month minimum history, 
respectively.9  The results in Table 5 show that MSB increases with sample length. MSB is 
estimated at 0.21, 0.71 and 0.90 per cent per annum for 12, 24 and 36 months respectively. These 
results are consistent with similar findings in Edwards and Caglayan (2001) and Fung and Hsieh 
(2000). The results in Table 5 demonstrate that hedge fund researchers who impose a minimum 
performance history on hedge fund track records are inadvertently creating an upward bias in 
their hedge fund return estimates.  MSB is an issue in hedge fund research as the conditioning on 
survival towards a required minimum sample length results in an analysis that excludes hedge 
funds with short life-spans, which tends to be non-survivors who exhibit poor performance.   
 
E. Survivor Premium 
An important aspect in an analysis of survivors and non-survivors is the estimation of the 
survivor premium which has received little research attention.  Blake and Timmermann (1998) 
who coined the term, survivor premium, define it as the mean portfolio return of survivors minus 
the mean portfolio return of non-survivors.  The survivor premium therefore measures the 
premium earned if investors are skilled or lucky enough to invest in a portfolio of survivors and 
avoid non-survivors.  Mutual fund investors can eliminate the variability of returns from the 
survivor premium by naively allocating their capital to a passive index fund manager. By making 
a passive investment decision, the survivor premium can therefore be eliminated.  In the case of 
hedge funds, the risk of the hedge fund survivor premium can not be avoided. As there is no 
generally accepted passive benchmark portfolio in the hedge fund industry, investors are exposed 
to the survivor premium at all times. 
 
The estimates in Table 4 show that an equal-weighted portfolio of survivors-only generates a 
return of 13.37 per cent per year while an equal-weighted portfolio of non-survivors returns 3.63 
per cent per year, resulting in a significant annual survivor premium of 974 bps. This result is 
consistent with Malkiel and Saha (2005) who estimated an implied average hedge fund survivor 
premium of 835 bps. 
 
To appreciate the magnitude of the hedge fund survivor premium, we can compare it with mutual 
fund estimates. Blake and Timmerman (1998) estimate the annual survivor premium on the UK 
mutual fund industry at 240 bps, while Drew and Stanford (2001) estimate the premium at 281 
bps per year on Australian pension equity fund managers. In US studies, Carhart, Carpenter, 
Lynch and Musto (2002) estimate an implied survivor premium of 400 bps per year while 
Malkiel and Saha (2005) report an average annual survivor premium of 429 bps. It is clear that 
the size of the survivor premium in hedge fund returns is two to four times the magnitude of that 
in mutual funds.   
 
                                                 
9 It is important to note that the adjusted dataset which has accounted for both survivorship and instant 
history bias contains funds whereby the first 12 months of history has been removed. To estimate 
multiperiod sampling bias, the dataset has a further 12, 24 and 36 month minimum history requirement  
imposed on the funds. 
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This size of the hedge fund survivor premium is so significant that considerable economic gain 
can be derived by selecting survivors and avoiding non-survivors when making hedge fund 
investment decisions. Figure 2 decomposes the hedge fund survivor premium into its two 
components of the survivor-bias and non-survivor bias and we report across all investment styles.  
The results in Figure 2 suggest that the primary contributor of the hedge fund survivor premium is 
the chronic poor performance from non-survivors. 
 
Figure 2 
Survivor Premium Decomposition 
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To understand the time-varying effects of the survivor premium, Figure 3 reports the monthly 
survivor premium over the 1994-2001 sample period.  The results in Figure 3 shows that the 
survivor premium is predominantly positive through time with the monthly premium reaching 
1.90 per cent in October 1998 (in the 58th month in the sample period) during the time of the 
LTCM and Russian financial market crisis. The survivor premium continues to be generated with 
the highest monthly premium reaching 4.15 per cent in April 2000 which coincides with the 
associated historical peaks in the United States equities markets the month before. We regress the 
survivor premium over time and report the results in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 
Regressing Survivor Premium on Time 
This table reports the regression of the monthly survivor premium for the 
1994-2001 sample period. 
Variable Coefficient SE p-value Adj. R-Sq 
  
Intercept 0.0019 0.0013 0.154 0.153 
Month 0.0001 0.0001 0.000  
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Figure 3 
Monthly Survivor Premium (1994-2001)  
The graph reports the mean portfolio of survivors minus the mean portfolio return of non-survivors for the 1994-2001 
period. The survivor premium earned over time shows the premium increasing in October 1998 during the LTCM and 
Russian financial market crisis. The highest monthly survivor premium is 4.15 per cent which occurs in April 2000.  
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Finally, we examine the relationship between the survivor premium and fund age in Table 7 and 
Figure 4.  In other words, is the survivor premium related to the age of the funds? To evaluate this 
relationship, we re-calculate the survivor premium by grouping the mean monthly returns of 
surviving funds based on age minus the mean portfolio return of non-survivors based on age also. 
The results in Figure 4 show that the survivor premium exhibits higher variability for younger 
aged funds and becomes more stable as fund age lengthens. These results must be tempered by 
the regression results in Table 7 which suggest that there is no statistical significance between the 
survivor premium and fund age. 
 
Table 7 
Regressing Survivor Premium on Fund Age 
This table reports the regression of the monthly survivor premium for the 
1994-2001 sample period based on the age of the funds. 
Variable Coefficient SE p-value Adj. R-Sq 
  
Intercept 1.011 0.211 0.000 0.014 
Fund Age -0.006 0.004 0.138  
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Figure 4 
Monthly Survivor Premium (1994-2001)  
The graph reports the monthly survivor premium conditional upon the age of the funds.  The results show that the 
highest variability in the survivor premium is evident in funds in their infancy.  As the age of a fund matures, it 
survivor premium steadily declines. 
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F. Economic Rationale for the Survivor Premium 
Why is the hedge fund survivor premium so large in comparison to the mutual fund survivor 
premium?  An economic rationale must be developed in order to better understand the differences 
in the size of the survivor premium.  Can we directly compare the mutual fund survivor premium 
with the hedge fund survivor premium? In this section, we develop an economic rationale which 
argues that the survivor premium estimate in these two sectors of the funds management industry 
actually measures different types of risk.  Following the theory of Sharpe (1964) we know that; 
 
Total Risk = Systematic risk (SR) + Idiosyncratic risk (IR). 
 
As stated in Waring and Siegel (2003), a mutual fund’s objective is to earn an excess return over 
a pre-specified benchmark portfolio subject to a predetermined set of limits.  In the case of 
mutual funds, the benchmark return is generally an associated index and the active fund manager 
can over or underweight portfolio exposures relative to their predefined benchmark.  The 
deviation in benchmark portfolio weightings determine the level of active risk taken by the fund 
manager.  The level of active risk determines the level of excess returns and the variability of 
these returns.  The dispersion of returns from the benchmark measures the variability of returns 
derived from the idiosyncratic risk. It is the idiosyncratic risk of active managers which 
eventually determines the difference in the returns of survivors and non-survivors.  By relating 
idiosyncratic risk to the survivor premium, we can formally propose that the survivor premium in 
the mutual fund industry is derived as follows; 
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Mutual Fund Survivor Premium = IR. of Survivors – IR. of Non-Survivors. 
 
In the case of hedge funds, the variability of returns reflects a different set of risks which are not 
well-defined.  First, hedge funds generally tend to be managed as an absolute return fund rather 
than a traditional mutual fund based on relative performance.  This shift in investment policy 
results in a more flexible mandate for the hedge fund manager.  At times, a hedge fund 
investment may include idiosyncratic risk only (eg. market neutral and fixed-income arbitrage 
funds) while other hedge fund investment strategies possess both systematic and idiosyncratic 
risk (such as global macro and managed futures funds).  The hedge fund investment styles that 
maintain both systematic and idiosyncratic risk possess a flexible mandate to actively asset 
allocate between the investment strategy (ie. risky assets) and the risk-free rate (ie. cash).  This 
causes the variability in hedge fund returns to be attributed to both systematic and idiosyncratic 
risks. This flexibility in hedge fund portfolios to possess elements of total risk therefore causes a 
wider dispersion in hedge fund returns.  Overall, the higher variability between the mean portfolio 
return of survivors and the mean portfolio return of non-survivors results in a larger survivor 
premium. We can formally express the hedge fund survivor premium as; 
 
Hedge Fund Survivor Premium = SR and IR of Survivors – SR and IR of Non-Survivors. 
 
This paper develops an economic rationale for the difference in the size of the survivor premium 
for the first time. For this rationale to hold true, we would expect a relatively small survivor 
premium for active funds whose performance can be directly related and measured to a passively 
replicated benchmark portfolio.  Conversely, we would expect a large survivor premium for fund 
managers which possess mandates which provide them flexibility to possess both systematic and 
idiosyncratic risks. 
5. CONCLUSION   
This paper demonstrates the problematic nature of hedge fund data biases. We highlight that the 
high attrition rates in hedge funds are twice the levels of those reported in mutual fund studies.  
These high hedge fund attrition rates are caused by the chronic poor performance of non-
survivors resulting in short life-spans.  These characteristics raise the profile of non-survivors as 
important contributors to any hedge fund analysis.  The importance of non-survivors is further 
evidenced in the survivorship bias estimate at 301 basis points per year which is twice as high as 
those reported in mutual fund studies.  We estimate the instant history bias at 167 basis points per 
year and the various impacts of multiperiod sampling bias at 21 to 90 basis points per year.  This 
evidence demonstrates that hedge fund returns possess an upward bias when they are conditioned 
for minimum sample length requirements.  When these biases have been accounted for, we find 
that survivor-only returns are inflated by as much as 45 per cent.   
 
Finally, we examine the hedge fund survivor premium which is an important concept in data 
biases which receives little research attention. The survivor premium informs us that investors 
who are skilled or lucky enough to invest in surviving funds and avoid non-survivors can garner a 
survivor premium of 974 basis points per year. We find that the hedge fund survivor premium is 
two to four times the size of the mutual fund survivor premium.  This finding is pivotal to 
investors wishing to construct hedge fund investment portfolios.  For the first time, we develop an 
economic rationale in order to explain the differences in the size of the mutual fund and hedge 
fund survivor premiums.  We show that the mutual fund survivor premium incorporates the 
variability in returns caused by idiosyncratic risk only. Conversely, the significant hedge fund 
survivor premium reflects the variability of returns caused by exposures to both systematic risks 
and idiosyncratic risks.   
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